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One way to ensure tactical satellite systems 
remain fully responsive to a field commander's 
needs would be to place all command and 
control' aspects of the system under direct 
field control. This paper presents the 
results of a study to evaluate the feasibility 
of field command of a notional tactical 
imaging satellite system. The study indicates 
that such a system is feaSible. A satellite 
constellation can be designed to provide the 
field commander with significant, timely, 
tactical data. The hardware is available, or 
will be within the near term, that enables 
field command and control facilities manned by 
a team fully integrated into the existing 
force struoture. Use of GPS receivers on the 
spacecraft, greater satellite autonomy, and a 
higher toleranoe for individual spacecraft 
failures can reduce the work load on 
ground-based controllers to manageable levelS. 
However, field command will place constraints 
on the amount of imagery that oan be obtained 
due to limited data transmission times and 
field commands with overlapping areas of 
interest oompeting for system access. 
kIn addition to the primary authors, significant 
contributions were provided by Dave England, Susie 
Saalwaechter, and Jon sims of the Space Technology Division, 
and Pat Bush of the Communications and Intelligence 
Division.The views, opinions, and findings contained in this 
report are those of the authors, and should not be construed 
as an official ANSER pOSition, polioy, or decision. 
INTltODOCTION 
Great strides have been made in recent years in 
miniatur-izing all aspects of satellite systems. prototype 
small satellites have been developed and demonstrated. 
Launch vehicles optimized for small payloads are under 
production. User equipment for many applications has been 
miniaturized. Special purpose command and control 
facilities are being prepared for several systems. Few 
studies have been done, however, to see how many aspects of 
the system can be combined to produce a complete system that 
would be respcnsive to a remote ccntrol site. We prepared 
this study to estimate the feasibility of tactical satellite 
field control. 
We examined current telemetry, tracking, and control 
(TT&C) schemes to identify the minimum elements necessary 
for successful field satellite ccmmand. The critical 
element needed is greater satellite autonomy. Two potential 
design enhancements that would reduce satellite dependency 
on complex ground based control networks and thus, improve 
spacecraft autonomy are independent satellite navigation 
systems and improved fault management systems. 
Additionally, mobile field command and control components 
were studied and two possible versions using currently 
available or near term hardware assets are presented. 
A tactical satellite system is useless if it does not 
provide data in a timely manner to the battlefield 
commander. This study investigated the time lines needed to 
generate satellite tasking at the field level, the ability 
to receive significant data during the limited pass times, 
and the impact of multiple users competing for access to the 
system. 
We used a notional tactical imaging satellite system 
developed in earlier studies as our baseline. This system 
was comprised of a constellation of satellites at 500 km 
altitude, with a 700 km swath width. 
GltOUND SUPPORT CAN BE KINIKIZED 
Complex ground facilities are presently used for 
spacecraft tracking. navigation updates. telemetry 
interpretation, fault management, and mission tasking. This 
elaborate command and control structure is manpower 
intensive and requires large, globally distributed 
facilities and antennas. Clearly this infrastructure and 
approach is not acceptable to a battlefield tactical 
satellite commander. To minimize ground control, satellites 
with more autonomy are needed. Autonomous satellites must 
, 
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be able to manage the day-to-day housekeeping 
correct detected faults, and independently 
posl tion and orientation. 
functions, 
determine 
Autonomous housekeeping is becoming fairly routine for 
many of today' 5 satellites. Power management and thermal 
control functions, as well as payload related activities 
such as tape recorder conditioning and fine sensor gain 
adjUstments are some examples of functions being performed 
by newer satellites without ground interaction. There are, 
however, longer term variations in housekeeping resulting 
from gradual changes in the satellite's orbit and seasonal 
changes in average sun angle and sunlit hours per day that 
require resolution. These effects may be too difficult for 
preprogrammed autonomous operation, but the impact on ground 
requirements will be slight if adjUstments are required only 
infrequently. 
On board fault management and anomaly resolution is a 
key improvement needed to improve satellite autonomy. There 
are generally three classes of anomalies: those that can be 
anticipated and easily corrected (such as failure of primary 
systems that have redundant back-up systems), those that can 
be anticipated but require involved procedures to correct 
(such as failure of a non- critical component that can be 
worked around), and those true anomalies that do not fit any 
anticipated failUre mode (such as those caused by 
single-event-upsets in a central processing unit). 
The first class of events can be, and often is, managed 
autonomously by current satellites, with a message down to 
the control center informing the operators of the change. 
The issue affecting development of field control of a 
lightsat system is how much capability to resolve the other 
two classes of events should be built into the satellite 
versus how much capability should remain with the operator. 
Those anomalies that require compromising some aspect of 
the satellite's mission Should be resolved on the ground, 
while those that are transparent to the user should be 
incorporated into a more sophisticated on-board fault 
management scheme. When the perturbation is a true anomaly, 
the most cost effective system solution is likely to be 
shutting down that satellite. This "disposable" ccncept is 
driVen by three constraints. First, the personnel training, 
on-site references, and work area needed to aggressively 
pursue anomalies would be extensive. Second, a field unit 
will be too involved in collecting data and preparing orders 
to be able to deal with complex problems affecting only one 
part of the overall system. Finally, bUilding an 
infrastructure that would allow the field to hand-over 
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problem satellites to another entity would be expensive and 
could jeopardize the field control concept. 
The -last, but most significant, aspect of satellite 
autonomy is satellite attitude control and navigation. An 
autonomous navigation system and Attitude Determination and 
Control System (ADACSj must compensate for or predict 
changes in spacecraft position and attitude that oocur due 
to forces on the spacecraft while in orbit. Atmospheric 
drag is the major oontributor to these orbital changes in 
low earth orbit. ADACS exist, nearly in off-the-shelf form, 
to maintain the proper satellite orientation. Accurately 
determining orbital position is, however, the main stumbling 
block toward acheiving true satellite autonomy. 
Several navigation methods are being examined by 
satellite designers. The best of these, employing GPS 
receiVers, relies on external signals, but generates very 
accurate ephemeris data. Advanoed earth, moon, and sun 
triangulation schemes for navigation do not require 
externally generated inputs and alSO appear promising, 
although these me'thods are not as accurate as GPs-based 
systems. 
The addition of GPS receivers on individual satellites 
would significantly enhanoe satellite autonomy. Each 
satellite would be able to receive signals from the GPS 
constellation and precisely determine its own pcsition, 
ephemeris, and possibly attitude as well. This would 
eliminate dependency on the Air Force Satellite Control 
Network to calculate exact orbital parameters and would be 
the most important single step toward giving the tactical 
commander scle contrcl over the satellite. 
Off-the-shelf space qualified GPS receivers are 
currently available whiCh meet lightsat size and weight 
restrictions. Within five to ten years several 
manufaoturers plan to market single circuit card GPS 
receivers for satellites. Which will allow the GPS system to 
be included as an integral part of the satellite's command 
and control module, further reducing total satellite size 
and mass. 
Relying on GPS signals for navigation doeS involve some 
risk, however. GPS is an cuts ide signal source and thus the 
satellite system would not be totally autonomous. This is 
mitigated somewhat by the fact that if the GPS system is 
plaCed at risk during times of contlict, its inherent 
redundancy and survivability ensures that derived positional 
accuracy will degrade in a gradual manner • 
• 
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To summarize this section, several steps can be taken to 
minimize ground station interactions with a small satellite 
system. The satellite can be made more autonomous by taking 
on the -navigation, housekeeping, and simple maintenance 
responsibilities. The satellite and the ground controller 
can share modest fault management activities. In this 
architecture, an indigenous capability for oomplex anomaly 
resolution is not required and should not be instituted. 
GROURO SUPPORT HARDWARE IS AVAILABLB 
Field telemetry, tracking, and control (TT&C) sites must 
be mobile and flexible enough to operate under a Wide range 
of battlefield conditions. Modular hardware currently 
exists, or is under development, to build these field TT&C 
units. We examined two implementation concepts. The first 
would be able to conduct mission tasking and limited TT&C. 
The second concept would expand the TT&C capability to 
permit monitoring and maintenance of the spacecraft. In 
each case, we explored the ability to utiliZe planned 
upgrades to existing military vehicle chassis and mobile van 
concepts. 
We assumed the facility would normally be located at the 
corpS/Division level, that it would be integrated into the 
contiguous command facilities, and that fuel, water, and 
crew support would be available on site. 
The mobile site with limited TT&C capabilities would be 
designed to execute: 
Mission related activities; 
Data commanding 
Data receipt 
Quick-look analysis 
Data tranSfer to existing processing 
and exploitation oenters 
TT&C related activities: 
Monitor aggregate spacecraft health 
Evaluate quality of data downlink 
Modest anomaly resolution via menu-driven 
algorithms 
The mobile site with expanded TT&C capability would 
perform all of the functions assigned to the limited site 
and be able to execute: 
Additional TT&C related activities: 
Monitor payload and bus subsystem status 
Initiate limited orbit station-keeping maneuvers 
Conduct improved anomaly resolution 
Figure 1 illustrates notional implementation concepts 
for both versions. Each system could be compatible with the 
new Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles. The electronics, 
hardware, and shelters/chassis are standard. Power would be 
supplied by a very high speed, compact, turbine driven 
generator. No enabling technologies are required. 
The limited site could be fully contained within a 3D-foot 
standard van or trailer. This would include an integral S-
or X-band tracking antenna, the power generator, air 
conditioning, work space, chemical-biological-radiation 
(CBR) change out area, and electronics. Alternatively, the 
limited site could be packaged in a 20-foot van if a 
conventional diesel power generator is towed and CBR 
capability is reduced to sealed operation only. 
The fully capable system would require additional 
software, hardware (up to five Aircraft Transportable Racks 
(ATR) widths), and more work table and reference area for 
aggressive anomaly resolution. In addition, it would be 
provisioned for independent inital start up and limited 
duration operation. It could be fully contained within a 
40-ft van or packaged in a 30-ft van if the power generatcr 
is towed and CaR capability is reduced as in the limited 
site version. 
Either site would require three shifts of three people, 
an Operations Mission Controller, a communications 
Specialist, and an Equipment Maintenance Specialist/BaCkUp 
Operator. The enhanced version would place a higher work 
load on both the Mission Operator and Communicator. In 
addition, they would require a higher degree of systems 
engineering competence to handle higher order anomaly 
resolution. 
TIXILY DATA CAN BB DBLIVERED 
Unlike other tactical assets available to the 
battlefield commander, a small imaging satellite system 
would be confined to fixed orbits and may give onlY limited 
coverage of desired target areas. Figure 2 Shows the extent 
of the satellite control area {assuming a 500 km altitude 
orbit and a 5 degree elevation angle) along with the 
relative position and size of coverage circles for four 
different ground target locations (assuming a 700 km swath 
width for the imager and a range of 300 km from the command 
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site to the center of the target area). For perspective, 
the areas are shown superimposed on the United States. 
FigUre 3 shows the time lines associated with a typical 
target pass. The satellite will enter the field of view of 
the ground site 3 to 5 minutes before crossing into the 
target area. It will spend up to 2 minutes over the target 
area, with only 5 to 10 seconds to view a specific 30 to 60 
km square target site. The satellite will then have 3 to 5 
minutes to downlink the data. 
If the data can be down1inked at 20 megabits per second 
[typical for an X-band tracking antenna) a satellite would 
be able to transmit twelve to twenty 30 kIn square, 5 rn 
resolution images without data compression. 
Figure 4 illustrates the time lines associated with 
mission tasking, both for a preplanned mission and for an 
immediate request. During preplanned missions, OOllection 
management functions will require the longest lead times. 
All requests will be Submitted through command channels and 
proceed through the normal intelligence collection 
management process. This process helps to formulate 
detailed collection requirements into precise mission 
tasking while ensuring the the required information does not 
already exist and that the appropriate assets are used to 
collect the data. The mission manager determines the need 
fOr lightsat support. The asset manager ccnducts mission 
planning and coordination and directly tasks the ground 
control assets. The asset manager could be located at Ccrps 
or deployed in the field with the satellite ground support 
equipment. In either case the asset manager is the direct 
link between satellite operation and mission management. 
Immediate requests will be submitted directly to the asset 
manager. The asset manager could consolidate the immediate 
request with planned overflights or preempt missions. The 
time line accuracy will depend on the work load at the Ccrps 
level, . the priority of the imagery request, and the 
satellite availability. 
The limited time aVailable to command and then collect 
data from a satellite cculd be fUrther constrained if more 
than one command center is deployed in a theater. Figure 5 
shcws the extent cf the overlap for two command sites in a 
European theater. The widely varying geometries of 
successive satellite passes would make it difficult to 
arrange for a satellite's pass to be divided between the 
command centers in discreet time blockS. Three precedence 
schemes that cculd be used include; 
, 
Allocate specific satellites to specific command 
centers~ (This will limit the total passes available to any 
one center) 
Have a coordinating authority prioritize the 
requests. (This greatly inoreases the complexity of the 
command lines and limits the local commander's flexibility. 
It also runs the riSk of the coordinating authority taking 
over the asset.) 
Encode the requests with a priority and have the 
satellite sort the requests and deliver acoording to a n 
optimization scheme resident in the satellite c e n t r a 1 
processor. (This increases the complexity of the satellite 
software and runs the risk of the users abusing the 
prioritizing scheme.) 
To summarize this seotion, while contact times are 
extremely limited, it is feasible that the satellite could 
deliver near real time images to the field commander. The 
mission tasking can be accomplished at the field site. 
Multiple users will complicate the satellite tasking, but 
reasonable options exist to solve the precedence problem. 
CORCLesrOR 
We presented the results of a stUdy to evaluate the 
feasibility of field command of a notional tactical imaging 
satellite system. The study indicates that such a system is 
feasible. A satellite constellation can be designed to 
provide the field commander with significant, timely, 
tactical data. The hardware is available, or will be within 
the near term, that enables field command and control 
facilities manned by a team fully integrated into the 
existing foroe structure. The use of GPS receivers on the 
spacecraft, greater satellite autonomy, and a higher 
tolerance for individual spacecraft failures can reduce the 
work load on ground-based oontrollers to manageable levels. 
However, field command will place constraints on the amount 
of imagery that can be obtained due to limited data 
transmission times and field commands with overlapping areas 
of interest competing for system access. 
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